Au Royaume-Uni, les personnes handicapées militent depuis plusieurs décennies en faveur d’un accès égal aux espaces publics, comme en témoigne le travail de l’Union des personnes handicapées physiques contre la ségrégation. Cependant, alors que les espaces évoluent continuellement, notamment avec la mise à disposition de davantage de technologies en libre-service, il est important d’en étudier l’impact sur les personnes handicapées. Oliver (1990) soutient que les nouvelles technologies devraient servir les personnes handicapées plutôt que de les handicaper davantage (Ergard & Hansson, (...) 2021; Jokisuu et al., 2016 ; Sheldon, 2003). Alors que les recherches existantes montrent que les technologies en libre-service sont invalidantes pour un large éventail de consommateurs, cet article cherche à comprendre les expériences particulières des personnes atteintes de nanisme et la manière dont elles interagissent avec elles en raison d’une inadéquation de taille. S’appuyant sur des entretiens avec des personnes atteintes de nanisme vivant au Royaume-Uni, cet article s’intéresse au cadre conceptuel des paradoxes des produits technologiques de Mick et Fournier (1998) pour explorer leurs expériences de consommateur, y compris l’impact émotionnel qui en résulte lors de l’utilisation de la technologie en libre-service. Les résultats montrent que les personnes atteintes de nanisme adoptent de nombreuses stratégies d’adaptation pour y faire face, notamment la dépendance, l’interaction différente avec l’établissement et l’évitement. (shrink)

God’s omniscience generates certain puzzles, not least regarding how such omniscience is compatible with human free will. One option in this regard is to impose limitations on the scope of God’s knowledge, but that then poses the further question of how such limitations can be compatible with God’s nature as a perfect being. I offer a novel way of approaching these questions, which appeals to what I claim is an independently motivated distinction between lacking knowledge and being ignorant. In particular, (...) it is contended that God’s omniscience is best understood not as a complete knowledge of all truths, but rather as a kind of deliberate non-knowing that excludes ignorance. God might not know all truths, but that’s not because of any cognitive lack, and there is certainly no truth about which he is ignorant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Directions in Contemporary German AestheticsMatthew PritchardÄsthetisches Denken, 6th ed., by Wolfgang Welsch. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990 (2003), 223 pp.Aisthetik: Vorlesungen Über Ästhetik Als Allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre, by Gernot Böhme. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2001, 199 pp.Ästhetische Korrespondenzen: Denken Im Technischen Raum, by Reinhard Knodt. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994, 166 pp.The relationship between the Anglo-American and German aesthetic traditions is a paradoxical one. On the one hand, acquaintance with one or more figures from (...) the “great tradition” in German aesthetic thought over the last 250 years is a given for most philosophically oriented writers on aesthetics in Britain and America. Thinkers such as Kant or Adorno form a real and abiding part of our background. In some cases the connection with German intellectual lineages goes a good deal further. As an extreme case, take Terry Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic,1 whose engagement with German thought is so deep that I have come across it as a set text for aesthetics courses in German universities (despite the fact that none of the dozen authors Eagleton analyzes are cited in their original language). On the other hand, interest in contemporary German aesthetics in English and American circles appears to be relatively slight. One would have little idea, from reading any of the philosophical journals in English, of just how much activity there is in this area, only a small proportion of which has been translated, cited, or reviewed. And yet the past two decades have seen the publication of dozens of relevant books by German authors, many proposing independent theoretical approaches. Among these—aside from the books reviewed here—are the substantial work done on performance and performativity by Erika Fischer-Lichte (Ästhetik des Performativen, 2004) and Dieter Mersch (Ereignis und Aura, 2002); the theoretical oeuvre of the prize-winning literary critic Karl Heinz Bohrer, of which Suddenness: On the Moment of Aesthetic Appearance, originally published in 1981, has made it into English; Ruth Sonderegger’s Romantic-leaning plea Für eine Ästhetik des Spiels (2000); Dieter Heinrich’s work on the philosophy of art and subjectivity, Fixpunkte: Aufsätze [End Page 117] und Essays zur Theorie der Kunst (2003); Martin Seel’s Aesthetics of Appearing (2004); the traditional neo-Kantian perspective of the late Rüdiger Bubner as set out in his Ästhetische Erfahrung (1989); Gábor Paál’s Was ist schön?—Ästhetik und Erkenntnis (2003); Konrad Paul Liessmann’s Reiz und Rührung: Über ästhetische Empfindungen (2003)... the list could be continued. And this is not to mention empirical-psychological approaches, works on the history of aesthetics, the reception accorded to analytical aesthetics and American philosophers such as Goodman and Danto, or the continuation of European poststructuralist and Frankfurt School traditions (for example, in the work of Albrecht Wellmer and Christoph Menke).Given this large “backlog” of writing not yet assimilated into Anglo-American discussion, it makes sense to be selective and range a little further than the most recently published texts. Owing to sheer diversity, I cannot honestly claim that the three books I am going to discuss here are “representative” of the interests driving contemporary German aesthetics. But I have chosen them for certain common traits, traditions, and emphases that seem to me to present a stimulating contrast with the approach of Anglo-American philosophical aesthetics, while retaining many points of contact with non-German thought. That the contrast does not come down to the crass standoff of “analytical” vs. “Continental,” and all the clichés about academic style that go with it, should become obvious. It is more interesting than that, and although I want to leave the details to the discussion of the three books, I can mention at the outset a few aspects I regard as important. One is that none of these authors addresses themselves exclusively to either the philosophy of art or to the aesthetics of nature and the environment. Instead they tend to make points relating to both, or to regard both as aspects of a single situation. “Environmental aesthetics” in Anglo-American philosophy—for instance, the work of Allen Carlson—is not only of recent date but is still a subdiscipline separated from aesthetics... (shrink)

This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper (...) then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification. (shrink)

Re-Reading Hanslick’s Aesthetics: Die Rezeption Eduard Hanslicks im englischen Sprachraum und ihre diskursiven GrundlagenWILFINGALEXANDERHollitzer Wissenschaftsverlag. 2019. pp. 432. £60.00.

Response to Steven Bland’s ‘Interactionism, Debiasing, and the Division of Epistemic Labour’ (in Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder). Biased cognition is an obvious source of epistemic vice, but there is some controversy about whether cognitive biases generate reliabilist or responsibilist epistemic vices. Bland’s argument, in a nutshell, is that since the development of cognitive biases is due to the interplay of internal psychological processes and external (i.e., environmental) conditions, it cannot be expected that (...) a solution to the problem tackles only one of these dimensions. We argue that the complex architecture on which Bland’s coordinated approach is grounded appears to lose some stability once we analyze more closely its pillars. We shall concentrate our attention on the notion of reliabilist and responsibilist epistemic virtues that the approach should foster as well as on the educational implications of Bland’s view. (shrink)

The insightful commentaries to our contribution "Education as the Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue" (in 'Social Virtue Epistemology', (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, Routledge 2022) offered by Alessandra Tanesini and Lani Watson highlight some important aspects of the work that philosophers, education theorists, and educators should carry out to strengthen the theoretical and practical advantages of the educational approach we have proposed. This commentary briefly addresses a few points that could set the grounds for future investigations (...) on intellectual virtue-based approaches to education and their social dimensions. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe uma crítica à epistemologia anti-sorte, tal como defendida por Duncan Pritchard. A teoria de Pritchard é uma das mais bem desenvolvidas explorações do conceito de sorte, e da sua significação epistêmica. Ele julga possível derivar uma condição que exclua a sorte epistêmica a partir de uma análise modal do conceito de sorte. A cláusula epistêmica resultante é uma condição denominada princípio de segurança. Após apresentar a teoria e algumas de suas motivações, argumento que ela não (...) consegue responder a uma objeção apresentada por Mark McEvoy, e que consiste em uma variação do exemplo da loteria. Por fim, alego que o princípio de segurança, tal como defendido por Pritchard, não captura corretamente nossas intuições sobre quando sorte está ausente ou presente. (shrink)

Epistemology socialized Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9579-4 Authors Jeroen de Ridder, Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Extrait de P. Michon, Rythmes, pouvoir, mondialisation, Paris, PUF, 2005, p. 51-57. Dans son grand livre Les Nuer, Evans-Pritchard apporte tout un ensemble de matériaux qui permettent de porter encore un peu plus loin notre réflexion sur les rythmes de l'individuation. Grâce à lui, nous disposons du portrait psycho-sociologique d'une population archaïque établi par une observation de terrain. Or, le résultat est saisissant. Mauss avait déjà montré que l'idée traditionnelle au XIXe siècle – - Anthropologie.

Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I (...) argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University Press) (...) and Alan Millar (The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, 2010, Oxford University Press; Philosophical Issues, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance. (shrink)

Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic (...) luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions. (shrink)

de Brasi, Leandro_Epistemological Disjunctivism, by Duncan Pritchard.

Review of the book: Pritchard, D.. Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Pritchard sostiene que la condición de habilidad y la condición de seguridad le imponen demandas independientes al conocimiento, i.e., que la satisfacción de una no implica la satisfacción de la otra y que, por lo tanto, ninguna de ellas es suficiente por sí misma para ofrecer una caracterización adecuada de esta noción. Argumento, por el contrario, que no hay buenas razones para pensar que la condición de seguridad es insuficiente. Empleando algunos conceptos de Greco y Pritchard y Kallestrup (...) para caracterizar a las habilidades cognitivas y el caso del mentiroso consistente de Lackey, argumento que TEMP, el caso clave de Pritchard para mostrar que puede haber seguridad sin habilidad, no funciona porque el proceso cognitivo relevante constituye una realización legítima, aunque anómala, de una habilidad. Pritchard maintains that the ability and the safety conditions impose independent demands on knowledge, i.e., that satisfying only one of them is not sufficient to acquire knowledge. I argue that there are no good reasons to suppose that the safety condition is not sufficient. I claim that TEMP, the key case proposed by Pritchard to show that there can be safety without ability, fails because therelevant cognitive process constitutes a legitimate, although anomalous, realization of a cognitive ability. (shrink)

Pritchard propone revitalizar el proyecto analítico para la noción de conocimiento: ofrecer una caracterización informativa y no circular de la misma. Cree que la clave es entender que las dos intuiciones centrales a esta noción imponen demandas independientes. Sostengo, por el contrario, la suficiencia de la condición anti-suerte. No solo respondo al argumento de Pritchard sino que desarrollo una línea alternativa inadvertida por él, pero implicada por supuestos suyos sobre la condición anti-suerte. Sostengo que una concepción evidencial de (...) la seguridad la hace dependiente de una condición de habilidad. Fortalezco la defensa de la epistemología anti-suerte minando dicha concepción. (shrink)

Pritchard sostiene que la condición de habilidad y la condición de seguridad le imponen demandas independientes al conocimiento, i.e., que la satisfacción de una no implica la satisfacción de la otra y que, por lo tanto, ninguna de ellas es suficiente por sí misma para ofrecer una caracterización adecuada de esta noción. Argumento, por el contrario, que no hay buenas razones para pensar que la condición de seguridad es insuficiente. Empleando algunos conceptos de Greco y Pritchard y Kallestrup (...) para caracterizar a las habilidades cognitivas y el caso del mentiroso consistente de Lackey, argumento que TEMP, el caso clave de Pritchard para mostrar que puede haber seguridad sin habilidad, no funciona porque el proceso cognitivo relevante constituye una realización legítima, aunque anómala, de una habilidad. Pritchard maintains that the ability and the safety conditions impose independent demands on knowledge, i.e., that satisfying only one of them is not sufficient to acquire knowledge. I argue that there are no good reasons to suppose that the safety condition is not sufficient. I claim that TEMP, the key case proposed by Pritchard to show that there can be safety without ability, fails because therelevant cognitive process constitutes a legitimate, although anomalous, realization of a cognitive ability. (shrink)

Cet article oppose les traditions anthropologiques française et anglaise sur leur traitement du problème de la magie, en particulier sur les deux questions que pose le phénomène de la magie : quel type de rationalité donne à la magie son efficacité alors qu’elle ne fournit aucune prévision ? Comment passe-t-on de la rationalité magique à une rationalité critique et scientifique ? Après un rappel des rapports entre magie, religion et science tels qu’il sont conçus par Tylor et Frazer, on oppose (...) l’idée d’une plasticité des énoncés magiques en fonction des contextes pragmatiques où ils s’inscrivent, chez Malinowski et Evans-Pritchard, et l’idée d’une structure de la pensée magique qui viendrait prendre corps dans les actes de l’individu magicien, chez Mauss et Lévi-Strauss. On conclut alors sur la façon dont ces deux traditions abordent le problème d’une logique de la pratique, et sur les conséquences qu’une telle différence dans la position des problèmes peut avoir aujourd’hui. (shrink)

Plusieurs ouvrages récents abordant l'œuvre de Lucien Lévy-Bruhl sur la « mentalité primitive » font apparaître un renouveau des commentaires. Empruntant des directions diverses, ils mettent l'accent sur une inspiration éthique de cette œuvre, sur le rapport de Lévy-Bruhl à Evans-Pritchard et Wittgenstein, sur la permanence de l'archaïque aujourd'hui, sur le rôle joué par Lévy-Bruhl dans le développement de l'histoire philosophique des sciences en France. Ils témoignent ainsi de l'actualité tant philosophique qu'anthropologique de cet auteur. Several recent studies treating (...) Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's works on "primitive mental­ity" bring forth a renewal of commentaries. Approaching from various directions, they emphasize the ethical inspiration of his work, the links between Lévy-Bruhl and Evans-Pritchard as well as Wittgenstein, the per­manence of the archaic today, the part played by Lévy-Bruhl in the development of the philosophical history of the sciences in France. They draw our attention to the continuing relevance of this scholar for philosophy and anthropology. (shrink)

Pritchard sostiene que la condición de habilidad y la condición de seguridad le imponen demandas independientes al conocimiento, i.e., que la satisfacción de una no implica la satisfacción de la otra y que, por lo tanto, ninguna de ellas es suficiente por sí misma para ofrecer una caracterización adecuada de esta noción. Argumento, por el contrario, que no hay buenas razones para pensar que la condición de seguridad es insuficiente. Empleando algunos conceptos de Greco y Pritchard y Kallestrup (...) para caracterizar a las habilidades cognitivas y el caso del mentiroso consistente de Lackey, argumento que TEMP, el caso clave de Pritchard para mostrar que puede haber seguridad sin habilidad, no funciona porque el proceso cognitivo relevante constituye una realización legítima, aunque anómala, de una habilidad. Pritchard maintains that the ability and the safety conditions impose independent demands on knowledge, i.e., that satisfying only one of them is not sufficient to acquire knowledge. I argue that there are no good reasons to suppose that the safety condition is not sufficient. I claim that TEMP, the key case proposed by Pritchard to show that there can be safety without ability, fails because therelevant cognitive process constitutes a legitimate, although anomalous, realization of a cognitive ability. (shrink)

Extrait de P. Michon, Rythmes, pouvoir, mondialisation, Paris, PUF, 2005, p. 58-66. Les travaux de Marcel Granet sur la Chine ancienne, accomplis au cours des mêmes années que ceux de Mauss et d'Evans-Pritchard, sont très importants pour notre connaissance de l'histoire des rythmes de l'individuation. Ils restituent le passage d'un type de société relativement archaïque, encore en partie polysegmentaire, à une société unifiée, beaucoup plus différenciée et où se sont déjà installés des pouvoirs plus (...) - Etudes chinoises – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

Extrait de P. Michon, Rythmes, pouvoir, mondialisation, Paris, PUF, 2005, p. 81-88. Dans son introduction à la réédition des Nuer, Louis Dumont a fait envers Evans-Pritchard une double opération analogue à celle que Lévi-Strauss avait effectuée en 1950 vis-à-vis de Mauss : il a cherché à montrer, d'une part, qu'Evans-Pritchard aurait anticipé le structuralisme, mais que, d'autre part, cette anticipation ne se serait pas réalisée de manière totalement pure - Anthropologie.

This paper has three purposes. The first and main one is to show that certain deep disagreements are rationally resolvable. The procedure of rational reso-lution of these disagreements is the same as the one Duncan Pritchard (2011, 2021) thinks that allows to resolve any deep disagreement. Thus, the second purpose of this paper is to give some reasons to think, against Pritchard, that this procedure only allows to resolve a certain kind of deep disagreements. The third purpose, which (...) is treated as subsidiary of the first one, is to defend the characterization of deep disagreement used here against two alternative cha-racterizations. (shrink)

The following paper analyzes some epistemological categories from anthropological problem of understanding a “strange” form of life. To do this, it is taken the philosophical social program of Peter Winch and in particular his critique of classic anthropology “Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande” by Evans-Pritchard. Winch, following Wittgenstein, represents a true paradigm shift within the analytic tradition of social science, which shows some similarities with hermeneutics, philosophy and intercultural ethics and pragmatism. In this context, the problem of (...) the multiplicity of forms of life and the respective “commensurability” of standards of rationality it is taken. In response to the charge of “relativism” from his theoretical proposal, it can be said that there are two categories of anthropological and social analysis that would allow or that would guide intercultural understanding: formal analogies and limiting notions. Finally, these categories are contrasted with the perspective of Karl-Otto Apel. (shrink)

The paper explores the main paradigmatic failures of structural functionalism in anthropology. Structural functionalism explains institutions and social behavior by their contribution to the reproduction of social structure. Starting from Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, who represent two main variants of functionalism in anthropology, its main paradigmatic problems are discussed: its inability to analyze social conflict and change, its reducing of society to norms and values as well as its mode of explaining social facts. These failures are illustrated by two functional theories (...) of tribal wars, by Evans-Pritchard and by Rappaport. Various theoretical alternatives emerge from the decline of functionalism in anthropology. Conflict theory as well as game theory, new institutionalism, theories of collective action and evolutionary economics represent true alternatives. This again is illustrated by a theory of tribal war, explaining cooperation both within local groups and between allies against the background of the warlike social environment in which local groups are interacting. (shrink)

RESUMEN D. Pritchard ha sostenido que el conocimiento requiere la satisfacción de una condición de habilidad y una anti-suerte que no guardan relación de implicación entre sí. Se sostiene que la satisfacción de una condición anti-suerte implica cumplir con la condición de habilidad, primero, porque, las características centrales del caso de D. Pritchard en contra de esta implicación son compartidas con casos en los que hay habilidad; y segundo, el caso de A. Goldman del dios benevolente es más (...) efectivo que TEMP, pero involucra un tipo de seguridad diferente a la requerida para el conocimiento. Por último, se muestra que la respuesta de D. Pritchard al problema de la generalidad bloquea la implicación de seguridad a habilidad. Se propone un contraejemplo, adaptando un caso tomado de la epistemología del testimonio. ABSTRACT D. Pritchard holds that knowledge requires the satisfaction of an ability condition and an anti-luck condition that bear no relation of implication to each other. The article argues that the satisfaction of the anti-luck condition implies satisfying the ability condition for two reasons: first, that the main characteristics of Pritchard's case against this implication are shared by cases in which there is ability; and, second, that although A. Goldman's benevolent demon case is more effective than TEMP, it involves a different type of certainty than that required for knowledge. Finally, the article shows that Pritchard's response to the generality problem blocks the implication between certainty and ability, and proposes a counterexample that draws on the epistemology of testimony. (shrink)

Pritchard sostiene que la condición de habilidad y la condición de seguridad le imponen demandas independientes al conocimiento, i.e., que la satisfacción de una no implica la satisfacción de la otra y que, por lo tanto, ninguna de ellas es suficiente por sí misma para ofrecer una caracterización adecuada de esta noción. Argumento, por el contrario, que no hay buenas razones para pensar que la condición de seguridad es insuficiente. Empleando algunos conceptos de Greco y Pritchard y Kallestrup (...) para caracterizar a las habilidades cognitivas y el caso del mentiroso consistente de Lackey, argumento que TEMP, el caso clave de Pritchard para mostrar que puede haber seguridad sin habilidad, no funciona porque el proceso cognitivo relevante constituye una realización legítima, aunque anómala, de una habilidad. Pritchard maintains that the ability and the safety conditions impose independent demands on knowledge, i.e., that satisfying only one of them is not sufficient to acquire knowledge. I argue that there are no good reasons to suppose that the safety condition is not sufficient. I claim that TEMP, the key case proposed by Pritchard to show that there can be safety without ability, fails because therelevant cognitive process constitutes a legitimate, although anomalous, realization of a cognitive ability. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar la relevancia de la teoría informacional del conocimiento para el problema de la suerte epistémica. Argumento que el clásico enfoque de Dretske es equivalente a la condición de seguridad de Pritchard. Sin embargo, considero que esta manera de eludir la suerte epistémica exige lidiar con el llamado "problema de la generalidad". Argumento que una respuesta a este problema requiere una noción de seguridad diferente y propongo un enfoque informacional equivalente a esta (...) versión del requisito. Concluyo que este enfoque es preferible a la condición de seguridad propuesta porque desvela relaciones conceptuales entre los elementos que constituyen el conocimiento.The aim of this paper is to determine the relevance of an informational theory of knowledge to address recently discussed epistemic problems. I argue that Dretske's classical approach is equivalent to the safety condition proposed by Pritchard to avoid epistemic luck. However, I claim that Pritchard's condition has to be modified to avoid the so-called "generality problem" for reliabilism. I propose an alternative version of the requirement to deal with these problems and provide an equivalent informational condition. I conclude that this informational version is preferable since it reveals conceptual relationships between the constituents of knowledge. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar la relevancia de la teoría informacional del conocimiento para el problema de la suerte epistémica. Argumento que el clásico enfoque de Dretske es equivalente a la condición de seguridad de Pritchard. Sin embargo, considero que esta manera de eludir la suerte epistémica exige lidiar con el llamado "problema de la generalidad". Argumento que una respuesta a este problema requiere una noción de seguridad diferente y propongo un enfoque informacional equivalente a esta (...) versión del requisito. Concluyo que este enfoque es preferible a la condición de seguridad propuesta porque desvela relaciones conceptuales entre los elementos que constituyen el conocimiento.The aim of this paper is to determine the relevance of an informational theory of knowledge to address recently discussed epistemic problems. I argue that Dretske's classical approach is equivalent to the safety condition proposed by Pritchard to avoid epistemic luck. However, I claim that Pritchard's condition has to be modified to avoid the so-called "generality problem" for reliabilism. I propose an alternative version of the requirement to deal with these problems and provide an equivalent informational condition. I conclude that this informational version is preferable since it reveals conceptual relationships between the constituents of knowledge. (shrink)

La récente édition de l’inédit de jeunesse de Lévy-Bruhl sur la psychologie de Spinoza permet de donner tout son poids à la déclaration livrée beaucoup plus tard par l’historien de la philosophie moderne, dans une lettre à Evans-Pritchard, sur l’inscription de sa recherche dans un dialogue avec Spinoza et Hume. On relit cet inédit en soulignant l’importance de la logique des sentiments dans l’ Éthique, en mettant en relation l’appartenance de Spinoza au champ cartésien avec l’associationnisme de la tradition (...) empiriste, et on encadre ainsi l’œuvre de Lévy-Bruhl dans toutes ses phases. On esquisse également un parallèle avec Derrida, qui resterait à approfondir. (shrink)

This text consists of replies to commentaries by Michael Williams, Duncan Pritchard and Javier González de Prado on my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology.

Ownership is a relation with characteristics that force society to function more effectively and that make property a target of much hostility. Among the intellectual enemies of property, Locke is arguably the most influential. His “enough and as good left for others” condition, that he believed to be easily satisfied, was a failed attempt morally to justify property. Instead, it succeeded in undermining its legitimacy. Hume identified the existence of a convention,—in today's language, a Nash-equilibrium—which, being wholly voluntary and ageless, (...) has attractive moral qualities besides ensuring the “stability of possession”. A recent attack against the “myth of property” by Murphy and Nagel is guided by an erroneous understanding of the nature of conventions. Footnotes1 A three-part essay of the author, under the same title, treating the subject somewhat differently, has been published in August-September 2003 online in the ‘Library of Economics and Liberty’ of Liberty Fund. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta mostrar el modo en que Tomás de Aquino tematiza el vicio de la acedia como taedium operandi en la Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 35. Para ello, se procederá en la recuperación, y consecuente análisis, de los elementos tanto sistemáticos cuanto doctrinales sobre cuya base el Aquinate desarrolla esta temática.

Les textes de la troisième "Critique" d'Emmanuel Kant révèlent le paradoxe de sa philosophie du droit illustré par la contrainte du droit et l'enthousiasme pour la Révolution de 1789. Pour le philosophe, ce signe d'histoire annonce la question d'un progrès irréversible pour l'humanité.

The previous chapter offers a distinctive virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, which the chapter describes as dispositional robust virtue epistemology. It is argued that this view is ultimately untenable because it cannot accommodate what we refer to as the epistemic dependence of knowledge. This point is motivated by employing what we call an epistemic Twin Earth argument, and also by appealing to some familiar claims in the epistemology of testimony. In addition, it is claimed that there is an alternative proposal available, (...) which we refer to as anti-luck virtue epistemology, that can accommodate epistemic dependence and which can thus offer a more satisfactory account of knowledge. (shrink)

Humphreys and Forde fail to account for the ontology of the “features” that they claim are constitutive of concepts. This failure is common to decompositional theories of conceptual representation. Category-specific deficits can be better explained by a theory that takes inferential relations among atomic concepts to be the key characteristic of conceptual representation and processing.